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Highlights: 
 
- This paper characterizes equilibrium bidding behavior in a multi-unit uniform-
price auction. 
- When bidders demand two units and valuations are independent, equilibrium 
bidding behavior entails bidding their values for the first unit, and bidding 
below their valuations for the second unit. 
- We provide a new characterization of equilibrium bidding behavior in this 
environment.  
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A new characterization of equilibrium in
multiple-object uniform-price auctions
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Abstract
This paper characterizes equilibrium bidding behavior in a multi-unit uniform-
price auction. As posited by Noussair (1995) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Kahn (1998), when bidders demand two units and valuations are independent,
equilibrium bidding behaviour entails bidding their values for the first unit,
and bidding below their valuations for the second unit. We identify some er-
rors in the analysis of Noussair (1995) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn
(1998), and provide a characterization of equilibrium behavior which involves
a threshold value that separates bidders who bid zero for the second unit from
those who shade their bids for the second unit.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a new characterization of equilibrium bidding behavior in a
multi-unit uniform-price auction. It corrects and complements Noussair (1995) and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), which were published nearly two decades
∗Corresponding author; email: p.khezr@uq.edu.au.
†Email: f.menezes@uq.edu.au.
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ago, at time where multiple-object auctions began to be used to solve complex allo-
cation problems such as the sale of the spectrum of frequency for mobile telephony
(Cramton et al. (2006), Milgrom (2004)) and the privatization of government-owned
companies through the sale of shares (Menezes (1995)).
While the last two decades have seen substantial progress in our understanding
of multiple-object auctions1, a number of papers in the 1990s show that the bidders
in a multi-unit auction may bid below their values in a uniform-price auction. This
phenomenon become known as ‘demand reduction’.
In particular, several papers demonstrated that demand reduction could be se-
vere. For example, Menezes (1995) showed the existence of an equilibrium in an
ascending price auction where bidders were characterized by a demand for a divis-
ible good, and where the auction never got off the ground, with the object being
sold at the reserve price. Noussair (1995) (hereafter referred to as Noussair) and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998) (hereafter referred to as EWK) examined
uniform-price, simultaneous auctions, where bidders demand two objects each and
claimed that there exist an equilibrium where bidders bid their values for the fist unit,
but they bid less than their values for the second unit, with some bidders bidding
zero for the second unit.
We identify the errors in the analysis of Noussair (1995) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans
and Kahn (1998), and provide a characterization of equilibrium behavior which in-
volves a threshold value that separates bidders who bid zero for the second unit from
those who shade their bids for the second unit.
2 Model
A seller has k > 1 identical objects for sale to n+ 1 potential buyers. Each buyer
demands two units of the good. We assume that 2(n+ 1) > k so that there is excess
demand. We denote by vi1 and vi2 the values that bidder i places on, respectively,
the first and second units, with vi1 ≥ vi2. The pair of values are independently and
identically drawn from a distribution function G(., .). Further, we assume that G1(v1)
and G2(v2) represent the marginal distributions of v1 and v2, with densities g1 and
g2, respectively, and support [0, v¯].
We consider uniform-price auctions where bidder submit two non-negative bids,
one for each unit, the goods are awarded to the kth highest bids, and winners pay
1For an introduction to multiple object auctions, see for example Krishna (2002) (chapters 12
to 17) and Menezes and Monteiro (2005) (chapter 7).
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the equivalent to the highest losing bid. The reserve price is set to zero so if there
are fewer than k non-zero bidders, all winners pay a price of zero.
3 Equilibrium characterization in EWK and Noussair
We first compare the set-up and the results in Noussair and EWK. Noussair
analyses a more restrictive set of equilibria compared to EWK. In particular, Noussair
considers what he refers to as a typeM bidding functionB(·, ·), which is characterized
by an initial condition such that B(0, 0) = (0, 0), it is continuous, monotone and it
takes a value of zero for the second unit for valuations below a threshold.
EWK focus on a set of strategies, which they refer to as set S, where the higher
of the two bids equals the higher of the two valuations, and the lower of the two
bids is non-negative and no greater than the lower of the two valuations. They show
this set is the exact set of strategies that are not dominated. Note that in EWK
examples there are equilibria for cases in which no equilibrium involving type M
bidding functions exists.
Our starting point is EWK’s Theorem 4.2, which characterizes a threshold value
v∗ such that all bidders with values less than v∗ for the second unit, bid zero on the
second units as long as n + 1 ≥ k. EWK’s threshold value is determined by the
following expression:
(k − 1)(v∗ − b) g1(b)
1−G1(b) ≤ 1, (1)
for all b ∈ [0, v∗).
However, as we show in the next paragraph, this condition fails to characterize a
threshold value v∗ < v¯ such that bidders with values lower than that threshold bid
zero for the second unit. In fact, this condition only applies to a case where v∗ = v¯.
Therefore, Theorem 4.2 in EWK only provides a condition such that all bidders
bid zero for the second unit. In other words, Theorem 4.2 fails to characterize
equilibria where some bidders bid zero for the second unit, and others bid below
their valuations. This failure has further implications for EWK’s analysis, which we
will discuss further below.
To see why Theorem 4.2 of EWK fails for any v∗ < v¯, we follow EWK and define
F1(x) and F2(x) as the k− 1th and kth order statistics of n independent draws from
G1(.) draws respectively as follows:
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F1(x) =
n∑
r=n−k+2
(
n
r
)
[G1(x)]
r [1−G1(x)]n−r (2)
F2(x) =
n∑
r=n−k+1
(
n
r
)
[G1(x)]
r [1−G1(x)]n−r (3)
EWK acknowledge that the above equations represent the k− 1th and kth order
bid statistics – bidders bid their valuations for the first object in EWK’s equilibrium
candidate – when all bidders submit zero bids for the second unit. However, in the
proof of Theorem 4.2, they use the above equations for all bids in [0, v∗).
Now suppose that some bidders do not bid zero for the second unit, that is,
v∗ < v¯. In this case (2) and (3) no longer represent the k − 1th and kth order
statistics. Therefore, the condition in Theorem 4.2 is only true when v∗ = v¯.
In Corollary 3, EWK posit that if n+ 1 ≥ k, and condition (1) holds for v∗ = v¯,
then there is an equilibrium where the sales price is equal to zero. The analysis above
shows that Corollary 3 becomes trivial as the only value of v∗ that satisfies (2) and
(3) is v¯.
In summary, EWK’s condition (1), alongside the assumption that n + 1 ≥ k,
imply that there is a zero price equilibrium, whereby every bidder bids zero for the
second unit, rather than an equilibrium where some bidders may have non-zero bids
for the second unit. By inspecting condition (1), one can readily see that it is a
strong condition, that will become harder to be satisfied as the number of object for
sale increases, regardless of the number of bidders.
We now focus on Noussair’s Theorem 1 (p. 340), which establishes sufficient
conditions for a M type equilibrium to exist. According to the initial conditions of
the Theorem 1 on page 340, if n + 1 > k, then v∗ is equal to zero. As we have seen
above, this contradicts Theorem 4.2 of EWK, which states v∗ = v¯. In the next section
we correctly characterize v∗ and extend the result of Theorem 4.2 in EWK to allow
for some bidders to submit non-negative bids for the second object in equilibrium.
Noussair’s Theorem 1 also claims that if n+ 1 < k, then v∗ > 0, that is, bidders
with values less than v∗ bid zero for the second unit. The following Theorem provides
a simple proof to show that this claim is incorrect.
Theorem 1. When n+ 1 < k, bidding equal to zero for the second unit cannot be an
equilibrium.
Proof. Define c1 and c2 as the k−1th and kth highest competing bids facing bidder i.
Also H1 and H2 as their marginal distributions with density h1 and h2 respectively.
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Suppose v∗ > 0 and bidders with realized values below v∗ bid zero for the second
unit. We analyze three scenarios with respect to the competing bids as follows.
(1) c1 ≥ c2 > 0
(2) c1 > 0, c2 = 0
(3) c1 = c2 = 0
(4)
Suppose bidder i with realized value v2 < v∗, deviates from this strategy and
bids  for the second unit where 0 <  < v2. In scenario (1), for an  arbitrary close
to zero, the payoff of player i would remain the same. In scenario (2),  becomes
the highest losing bid and this has a negative effect on player i’s payoff equal to .
Suppose the probability that scenario (2) happens is γ > 0. Therefore, the expected
loss is γ. In scenario (3), player i wins the second unit and pays a price equal to
zero. Suppose the probability of the third scenario is κ > 0. Then there exist an
 > 0 such that, γ < κv2. Therefore, a bid equal to  for the second unit dominates
a bid equal to zero.
To see why an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 1 is not applicable to a
case where n+ 1 ≥ k remember that bidders bid their values for the first unit. Thus
when the number of bidders is at least as large as the number of units, then only
scenario (1) is possible.
4 The Main Result
What remains is the characterization of v∗ when n+ 1 ≥ k. The expected payoff
of a buyer who submits b1 and b2 with b2 < b1 is equal to2,
Π(v1, v2, b1, b2) = H1(b2)(v1 + v2)− 2
∫ b2
0
c1h1(c1)dc1 + (H2(b1)−H1(b2))v1
− (H2(b2)−H1(b2))b2 −
∫ b1
b2
c2h2(c2)dc2
(5)
Then the first-order condition with respect to b2 is,
2For further explanation regarding the derivation of this payoff see Krishna (2002), page 192.
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∂Π
∂b2
= h1(b2)(v2 − b2)−H2(b2) +H1(b2) = 0 (6)
This would result in the following bidding function.
b2 = v2 − H2(b2)−H1(b2)
h1(b2)
(7)
If the second-order condition of maximization is satisfied, then the bidding func-
tion in (7) is monotone and increasing in v. Now imagine there exist a v∗ such that
bidders with realized values equal or below it bid zero for the second unit. If this is
the case it must be such that bidders with value v∗ are indifferent between bidding
according to (7) or bidding equal to zero, that is,
Π(v1, v
∗
2, b2(v
∗)) = Π(v1, v∗2, 0) (8)
We use this fact to characterize v∗. From (5) we have,
H1(b2(v
∗))(v1 + v2)− 2
∫ b2(v∗)
0
c1h1(c1)dc1 + (H2(b1)−H1(b2(v∗)))v1
− (H2(b2(v∗))−H1(b2(v∗)))b2(v∗)−
∫ b1
b2(v∗)
c2h2(c2)dc2
= H2(b1)v1 −
∫ b1
0
c2h2(c2)dc2
(9)
After some manipulation we have,
H1(b2(v
∗))(v∗)− 2
∫ b2(v∗)
0
c1h1(c1)dc1
− (H2(b2(v∗))−H1(b2(v∗)))b2(v∗) +
∫ b2(v∗)
0
c2h2(c2)dc2 = 0
(10)
Integration by part yields,
H1(b2(v
∗))(v∗)− 2b2(v∗)H1(b2(v∗)) + 2
∫ b2(v∗)
0
H1(c1)dc1
− [H2(b2(v∗))−H1(b2(v∗))]b2(v∗) + b2(v∗)H2(b2(v∗))−
∫ b2(v∗)
0
H2(c2)dc2 = 0
(11)
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After simplifying we get,
H1(b2(v
∗))(v∗ − b2(v∗)) + 2
∫ b2(v∗)
0
H1(c1)dc1 −
∫ b2(v∗)
0
H2(c2)dc2 = 0 (12)
Substituting v∗ from the bidding function in (7) yields,
H1(b2(v
∗))(
H2(b2(v
∗))−H1(b2(v∗))
h1(b2(v∗))
) + 2
∫ b2(v∗)
0
H1(c1)dc1 −
∫ b2(v∗)
0
H2(c2)dc2 = 0
(13)
The following Theorem summarizes the above result.
Theorem 2. When the number of bidders is at least as large as the number of units,
the threshold value v∗ such that bidders with 0 < v2 < v∗ bid zero for the second unit
is given by,
v∗ = b2(v∗) +
H2(b2(v
∗))−H1(b2(v∗))
h1(b2(v∗))
(14)
where b2(v∗) is the solution to (13).
5 Conclusion
This paper characterizes equilibrium behavior in a multiple-object, uniform-price
auction. When bidders demand two objects, and their values for the two objects are
drawn independently from the a common distribution, we show the existence of an
equilibrium where bidders bid their true valuations for the first unit, but reduce their
demand for the second unit. In particular, in the equilibrium we identified, bidders
with a value above a certain threshold, make a non-zero bid for the second unit. The
threshold value, and their non-negative bids for the second unit, is a function of the
distribution of the kth and k-1th highest values. This new equilibrium characteri-
zation complements the analysis in Noussair (1995) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Kahn (1998).
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